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Incentives to change: effects of
performance-based financing on health
workers in Zambia
Gordon C. Shen1*, Ha Thi Hong Nguyen2, Ashis Das2, Nkenda Sachingongu3, Collins Chansa2,
Jumana Qamruddin2 and Jed Friedman4
Abstract
Background: Performance-based financing (PBF) has been implemented in a number of countries with the aim of
transforming health systems and improving maternal and child health. This paper examines the effect of PBF on
health workers’ job satisfaction, motivation, and attrition in Zambia. It uses a randomized intervention/control
design to evaluate before–after changes for three groups: intervention (PBF) group, control 1 (C1; enhanced
financing) group, and control 2 (C2; pure control) group.
Methods: Mixed methods are employed. The quantitative portion comprises of a baseline and an endline survey.
The survey and sampling scheme were designed to allow for a rigorous impact evaluation of PBF or C1 on several
key performance indicators. The qualitative portion seeks to explain the pathways underlying the observed
differences through interviews conducted at the beginning and at the three-year mark of the PBF program.
Results: Econometric analysis shows that PBF led to increased job satisfaction and decreased attrition on a subset
of measures, with little effect on motivation. The C1 group also experienced some positive effects on job
satisfaction. The null results of the quantitative assessment of motivation cohere with those of the qualitative
assessment, which revealed that workers remain motivated by their dedication to the profession and to provide
health care to the community rather than by financial incentives. The qualitative evidence also provides two
explanations for higher overall job satisfaction in the C1 than in the PBF group: better working conditions and more
effective supervision from the District Medical Office. The PBF group had higher satisfaction with compensation than
both control groups because they have higher compensation and financial autonomy, which was intended to be part
of the PBF intervention. While PBF could not address all the reasons for attrition, it did lower turnover because those
health centers were staffed with qualified personnel and the personnel had role clarity.
Conclusions: In Zambia, the implementation of PBF schemes brought about a significant increase in job satisfaction
and a decrease in attrition, but had no significant effect on motivation. Enhanced health financing also increased
stated job satisfaction.
Keywords: Performance-based financing, Pay-for-performance, Organizational behavior, Mixed methods, Human
resources for health, Health system strengthening, Zambia
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Background
Progress towards improving maternal and child health
(MCH) outcomes requires a certain level of human re-
sources to deliver health care services, but this has been
difficult in Zambia due to a human resources for health
(HRH) crisis [1–3]. Zambia faces severe health worker
shortages across all levels of health care, with 93 total
clinical health care workers (HCW)1 per 100,000 popula-
tion ratio in 2009 [1]. This translates to a 60% gap in the
required versus actual number of clinical health workers
nationwide [4]. An average annual attrition rate of 4%
from 2007 to 2009 effectively cancelled out gains made
in the number of employees recruited [5]. HCWs are
not evenly distributed between rural and urban parts of
the country: 159 clinical health care workers per 100,000
population in urban areas versus 70 clinical health care
workers per 100,000 in rural areas of the country [1].
The HRH shortage has been exacerbated by high levels
of absenteeism (21%), tardiness (43%), dissatisfaction
(44%), and vacancy (33.5%) rates in 2006 [6]. This situ-
ation is compounded by an imbalance in skill-mix
among HCWs, and limited funding and training institu-
tions. The implementation of HRH Strategic Plans
2006–2010 and Zambian Health Workers Retention
Scheme resulted in increased staff recruitment, appoint-
ment, and retention. However, low salaries and poor
working conditions continued to affect health workers’
morale. Workforce maldistribution is further exacer-
bated by brain drain2 and by increased demands placed
on the health systems by patients with communicable
and non-communicable diseases alike [7, 8].
From 2012 to 2014, the Zambian government intro-
duced a large-scale performance-based financing (PBF)
program to enhance the performance of existing health
workers for MCH services. PBF programs typically use
incentives to encourage providers to increase the
provision of services and adopt best practices for quality
by following explicit protocols and complying with a sys-
tem of inspection and auditing.3 Monetary or non-
monetary incentives can be directed at individual health
care workers or at the health facility as a whole, and
therefore districts in Zambia were randomly assigned to
one of three study groups: intervention districts (PBF),
input-based financing districts (C1), and pure control dis-
tricts (C2).4 To date there is more evidence focused on
the impact of PBF on patient outcomes [9–14] rather than
on health care provider outcomes [15, 16]. This paper
evaluates the effects of this PBF program on health
workers’ satisfaction, motivation, and attrition, and exam-
ines the potential causal pathways leading to such effects.
Theoretical framework
HRH is an important node in the causal pathway from
PBF to desired service provision and ultimately population
health outcomes. Figure 1 is a display of our theory of
change which posits that HRH—at the individual or na-
tional level—changes as a result of the implementation of
a PBF program in Zambia.5 At the individual worker level,
our model teases apart the type of incentives, as well as
the combination of incentives, that could improve
personnel shortage and low morale. At the national work-
force level, we lay out a set of enabling and disabling con-
ditions that are mediators of PBF and HRH. Introducing
monetary incentives to designated health facilities could,
in theory, help achieve systemic objectives to increase
the availability, distribution, and performance of the
workforce.
In this study we are interested in the differential ef-
fects of monetary incentives tied to the activities or ef-
forts of workers (i.e., PBF bonuses) versus alternative
financing modes’ (i.e., enhanced financing, status quo)
effects on two individual HRH outcomes determining
national workforce performance (motivation, job satis-
faction) and an individual HRH outcome (attrition) de-
termining national workforce distribution, as shown in
Fig. 1. Motivation is individuals’ willingness to sustain
efforts towards achieving pre-determined goals. Incen-
tives can be a source of motivation because an individual
or an organization would perform an action in order to
attain a valued resource [17]. But health workers may
burnout from increased demands on them to meet PBF
targets in the long run. The empirical evidence of incen-
tives on motivation is mixed,6 though more recent
empirical evidence from sub-Saharan Africa suggests
that we would expect to see a spike in motivation early
in the PBF program’s implementation.7 We therefore
hypothesize that PBF will have a positive effect on
Zambian health workers’ motivation during our study
period. We further hypothesize that enhanced financing
would also have a positive effect on motivation, but with
a lower magnitude than PBF because enhanced financing
is targeted towards the health facility as a whole rather
than individual health workers and is not linked directly
to performance. Similar hypotheses can be made for job
satisfaction.8
PBF is related to motivation and job satisfaction, which
are predictive of turnover. The first two steps in
Mobley’s heuristic model of employee withdrawal deci-
sion process is evaluation of existing job and experi-
enced job satisfaction or dissatisfaction [18]. Psychology
studies conducted since have found that job satisfaction
was predicted by the reward and cost values of the job
[19], and that job satisfaction was correlated with job
turnover [20].9 High levels of motivation, like job satis-
faction, reduced the risk of low- and middle-income
country (LMIC) health workers’ intent of leaving their
jobs [21]. The motivation-turnover relationship is medi-
ated by affective commitment [22] and moderated by
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burnout [23]. These empirical studies that are conducted
either in the lab or in the field cumulatively suggest that
individual tenure in health care organizations is influ-
enced by extrinsic motivation, and mediated by job satis-
faction with their work setting. We thus hypothesize
that PBF and enhanced financing would each have a
negative effect on turnover, but enhanced financing
would have a lower effect magnitude than PBF because
satisfaction with compensation is a bigger determinant
of turnover than other aspects of job satisfaction.
The hypothesized magnitude and direction of PBF in-
fluence on HRH are summarized in Table 1.10 These hy-
potheses reflect the expectations given the organization
behavior literature and features of Zambia’s three-arm
PBF design.
Methods
The study setting (i.e., Zambia) and study intervention
(i.e., PBF in Zambia) are described in Additional file 1.
We gathered quantitative and qualitative data from
health workers and related health centers for this study.
The procedures for linking findings from qualitative and
quantitative research and bringing out their complemen-
tarities can be manifold [24, 25]. Therefore, we chose to
carefully interpret and triangulate the qualitative with
the quantitative data because our aim is model (i.e., Fig. 1)
testing [26].
Study design
This study is part of a broader impact evaluation study
aimed at measuring the effects of PBF on MCH and
other health system outcomes. The evaluation follows a
quasi-experimental design: 30 districts in the country
were triplet-matched on key health systems and out-
come indicators and randomly allocated to each study
arm. Thus there are 10 PBF, 10 C1, and 10 C2 districts.
The district selection process, the resulting list of dis-
tricts, their health facilities, and population under study
are further described in Additional file 2.
Health centers in targeted pilot districts were eli-
gible for PBF if it employed at least one qualified
health worker by the end of the first quarter of 2012.
Those health centers received PBF incentive payments
and emergency obstetric care (EmOC) equipment.
This PBF agreement is reinforced with an institution-
level contract (and a business plan) signed by DMOs
and health centers, and an individual-level “motivation
contract” signed by health workers and their affiliated
health center. The proportion of the individual PBF staff
bonus to the individual government salary was on average
10% during the entire duration of the project [27].11 The
determination of health center payment and individual
performance bonuses is further described in Additional
file 3.
Fig. 1 A general conceptual framework on the effects of PBF on HRH
Table 1 Hypothesized magnitude and direction of PBF on HRH
Intervention
(PBF) group
Control 1, or enhanced
financing not conditioned
on outputs
Control 2, or
“business-as-usual”
Motivation ++ +
Job
satisfaction
++ +
Attrition − −
There is a greater magnitude of effect for the intervention group than control
1 group, but the direction should remain the same. Control 2 cells are left
blank because no changes are expected to occur
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Health centers in the C1 group received additional fi-
nancing intended to equal to the average RBF incentive
payments in intervention districts, as well as EmOC
equipment. This additional financing was not tied to
performance, so health centers spent it as meal allowances
or on rehabilitation of the health center, drugs, outreach
activities, and equipment. Due to administrative bottle-
necks in the financing and procurement processes
adopted by the C1 districts, health facilities in the C1
group received on average a financing amount equal to
56% of the PBF group by the end of the study period.12
Health centers in C2 group represent “business-as-usual”
since they received neither additional financing nor
EmOC equipment.
This study was supported by the MOH of Zambia.
The research protocol was approved by the Institutional
Ethics Committee of the University of Zambia. Written
informed consent was collected from all respondents.
We kept all personal information confidential, and no
names were used in the resulting report or journal
articles.
Quantitative data collection and analysis
Quantitative measures pertaining to the HRH outcomes
of interest were assessed through surveys fielded in
health centers at baseline (October–November 2011)
and towards the end of the PBF pilot project
(September–November 2014).13 A total of 186 health cen-
ters were surveyed, consisting of 86 in the PBF group, 49
in C1 group, and 51 in C2 group. Up to two health
workers providing MCH services on the day of visit were
interviewed for the survey in every facility, for a total of
683 staff personnel interviewed in two rounds. Statistical
power for the overall evaluation was calculated using
population coverage of services as key outcomes for an
impact evaluation of PBF in Zambia, but power was not
calculated for HRH outcomes in this study.
Motivation and job satisfaction are derived from the
individual worker questionnaire and attrition is based on
the facility assessment. The questions for the motivation
and satisfaction were based on two existing, validated
tools: Minnesota Satisfaction Questionnaire [28] and Job
Satisfaction Survey [29]. In addition, the variables on
well-being were derived from the WHO Well-Being
Index [30]. The development of the motivation and job
satisfaction constructs are described in more details in
Additional file 4. Attrition was assessed by the number
of authorized staff reported to have left a health center
in the previous 12 months in a health facility survey.
The effects of PBF on key outcome variables were esti-
mated with difference-in-difference framework among
the PBF, C1, and C2 arms for two rounds of data
(baseline and endline). Facility fixed effects analysis was
performed with standard errors clustered at a district
level. District grouping was taken in to account in the
analysis through stratification controls. The difference-
in-difference model can be summarized in the form of a
linear regression equation as follows:
Y ijtd ¼ γ0 þ γ1PBFd þ γ2Periodt þ γ3 PBF  Periodð Þdt
þDPd þ Xijtd þ εijtd
where Y is the outcome for health worker i under facility
j at time t for district d; γ0 is a constant; PBF is a binary
variable taking the value of 1 for districts in the PBF
treatment area and 0 otherwise; Period is a binary vari-
able where it is 1 for the post-intervention period and 0
otherwise; γ1 and γ2 are the coefficients for treatment
and period, respectively; the interaction term is γ3 which
indicates the difference-in-difference treatment effect;
DP represents the district grouping stratification with a
vector of dummy variables indicating district inclusion
in particular province-level strata; X is a vector of
worker level covariates (age, gender, and staff position); ε
is the random error term. For most of the analysis, pair-
wise comparisons are separately estimated with PBF esti-
mated with the C1 group as the default category, and
then PBF with C2 as the default. The model comparing
C1 with C2 groups is specified exactly the same except
that PBF variable is replaced with a binary variable de-
noting C1. All statistical analyses were done with STATA
version 13.
Results of the three-group comparisons are shown in
Table 2 while results of the two-group comparisons are
shown in Additional file 5. One-way ANOVA shows that
at baseline there was no statistical difference among the
three groups, indicating baseline balance in key charac-
teristics that may mediate the impact of PBF on satisfac-
tion, motivation, and attrition.
Qualitative data collection and analysis
The second objective of our study is to understand the
possible channels through which financial incentives
affect health care providers. The second objective is pur-
sued through in-depth interviews conducted in health
centers, District Medical Offices (DMOs), and provincial
headquarter offices. Interviews were conducted at the
beginning of PBF implementation (“baseline”; November
2011–March 2012) and three years following it (“end-
line”; January 2015).14 Organization leaders were inter-
viewed individually, whereas staff members in a similar
level on the organization chart were interviewed in a
group. The sampling goal is to reach theoretical satur-
ation, during which all major concepts are identified and
additional interviews reveal no new information. A total
of 81 interviews were conducted at baseline and 54 in-
terviews were conducted at endline. The interviewees’
demographic information for baseline and endline is
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shown in Table 3. F4 software was used for transcription,
and NVivo 10 software (QSR International Pty Ltd,
Australia) was used for thematic analysis.
Results
In this section, we present results for the three HRH di-
mensions (motivation, job satisfaction, attrition), study
group differences for each dimension’s general construct
scores, and for each construct’s constituent variables.
Figure 2 summarizes the intermediary factors that
emerged from interviews, which we will explain along
with the regression analysis results.
Motivation
We did not find support for our hypotheses for any of
the eight motivation constructs with one exception: re-
spondents in the PBF group reported, out of 100%,
2.42% (p < 0.1) higher on the personal well-being scale
between baseline and endline than those in the C2 group
(Table 4). This aggregate finding is driven by respondents
in the PBF group who felt more calm and relaxed in the
2 weeks prior to reporting between baseline and endline
than those in the C1 group (9.48% higher; p < 0.1) or those
in the C2 group (5.69% higher; p < 0.05). The group differ-
ences for the eight motivation constructs are summarized
in Table 4.
Looking specifically at the individual questions under
each motivation construct (Additional file 6), the PBF
appears to have encouraged staff to willingly give their
time and help each other out when someone fell behind
or had difficulties with his or her work; 3.77% higher
(p < 0.05) between baseline and endline for the PBF
than for the C2 group. Finally, three of the motiv-
ation questions seemed to discern group differences,
which could be used and elucidated in future PBF re-
search. The three questions are as follows: “I would
prefer to work somewhere else than in this facility”
(12.27% lower between baseline and endline for the
PBF group than for the C1 group; p < 0.1); “My facil-
ity is a very dynamic and innovative place. People are
willing to take risks to do a job well done” (5.06%
higher between baseline and endline for the PBF
group than for the C2 group; p < 0.1); and “Following
procedures and rules is very important in my facility”
is 1.95% (p < 0.1) and 4.26% (p < 0.1) higher between
baseline and endline for the PBF and C1 group when
each of them was compared with the C2 group.
Interviews, in accordance with the null effects of PBF
on motivation, revealed that remuneration alone could
not adequately address two causes of de-motivation:
high workload and low staffing levels. Financial bonuses
paid out by the PBF program were adjusted by workload,
but they were not directly tied to the staffing level. This
Table 2 Mean statistics of workers’ characteristics at baseline and endline in three groups (N = 683)
Variable Baseline Endline
Intervention
(n = 147)
Control 1
(n = 87)
Control 2
(n = 92)
Intervention
(n = 166)
Control 1
(n = 92)
Control 2
(n = 99)
Female 0.42 0.38 0.42 0.41 0.36 0.49
Education-primary 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.05
Education-secondary 0.40 0.40 0.30 0.35 0.49 0.27
Education-college 0.52 0.49 0.63 0.60 0.49 0.68
Clinical officer 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.03
Nurse 0.25 0.26 0.25 0.33 0.35 0.45
Midwife 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.09 0.15
Environmental health technicians (EHTs) 0.15 0.09 0.16 0.13 0.08 0.10
Classified daily employees (CDEs) 0.33 0.41 0.32 0.31 0.38 0.22
Other staff 0.67 0.59 0.69 0.69 0.62 0.78
Age 37.43 38.01 36.21 35.82 38.51 35.49
Work-absence 1.20 1.44 1.59 1.12 1.10 1.74
Work-days 5.82 6.26 6.13 6.00 6.24 6.27
Work-hours 51.45 55.90 54.55 52.07 50.33 49.61
Supervision frequency from previous year 4.52 4.32 6.65 5.62 4.58 4.54
Work experience-total 10.06 11.04 9.76 8.03 9.03 7.95
Work experience-current facility 4.55 5.40 4.39 4.27 4.67 5.09
ANOVA test of balance among three groups was performed separately for baseline and endline. Statistical significance is denoted by bold italic (p < 0.01); bold
(p < 0.05); italic (p < 0.1)
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became problematic in health care settings where the
workload rose but staffing levels remained the same:
There is a small clinic…with [urban clinics having]
more nurses than we have here. We have tried to tell
them, ‘you guys give us some more nurses because we
are over worked here’. However, they behave as if
there is more work there than there is here. —Nurse,
Gwembe (PBF group)
Rural health workers felt they worked longer hours
compared to their urban counterparts who worked in
shifts because urban clinics were better staffed. As a re-
sult, they were not able to get any days off, rest after
completing work, or have some time for personal re-
sponsibilities. High workload, exacerbated by chronic
staff shortages, ultimately compromised health care
workers’ motivation to provide high-quality services.
Respondents provided reasons other than monetary
incentives for remaining in the health workforce during
the interviews, namely professional training and obliga-
tion to serve patients:
First of all you have to be proud about your own
profession and if you leave it who will handle it? …
[If] I leave my job because of the small salary and
whatever. I think that’s not right. I am just happy to
be what I am as a doctor. The profession itself is a
motivating factor. —Provincial Medical Officer,
Livingstone (not in a study group)
Even when it is over our working hours, we still come
to the clinic and attend to our patients because we
would not know what would happen; maybe the
patient’s condition can be worsen if we do not attend
to them early enough. —CDE, Itezhi-Tezhi (C1 group)
Our results thus raise important secondary questions
regarding the influence of extrinsic motivators (e.g., bo-
nuses from PBF scheme) versus that of intrinsic motiva-
tors (e.g., workers’ internal desire) for serving patients
and the community at large.15 We find Zambian health
workers’ performance appears to have been driven more
by internal rewards, such as passion for their job or pro-
fessional integrity, and are largely unaffected by the PBF
bonuses or enhanced financing.16 We echo Judson et al.
point that it is complex to determine the right balance
of extrinsic and intrinsic motivators in order to achieve
the “value goal” in PBF schemes [31].
Job satisfaction
We found support for hypotheses with overall job satis-
faction and compensation (see Table 5).
More specifically, we estimated a statistically signifi-
cant increase of 4.75% (p < 0.05) in overall job satisfac-
tion between baseline and endline for the PBF versus C2
group. The same effect was more pronounced—10.31%
(p < 0.05) higher—between baseline and endline for C1
versus C2 group. Though not statistically significant,
there is a 0.48% lower overall job satisfaction between
baseline and endline for the PBF than C1 group. Overall
Table 3 Interviewee characteristics of the qualitative sample
Facility Baseline Endline
Assignment
RBF 23 (30%) 32 (59%)
Control 1 23 (30%) 13 (24%)
Control 2 30 (40%) 9 (17%)
Type
District Community Medical Office (DCMO) 10 (13%) 12 (22%)
Health center 66 (87%) 42 (78%)
Worker
DCMO
District community medical officer 2 (20%) 2 (17%)
Nursing officer 2 (20%) 2 (17%)
Human resource officer 3 (30%) 3 (25%)
Others (planner, information officer, EHT) 3 (30%) 5 (40%)
Health center
Clinical officer 3 (5%) 2 (5%)
Registered nurse 2 (3%) 1 (2%)
Enrolled midwife 15 (23%) 4 (10%)
Enrolled nurse 15 (23%) 5 (12%)
Environmental health technician (EHT) 17 (26%) 7 (17%)
Classified daily employee (CDE) 12 (18%) 7 (17%)
Lab technician 2 (3%) 16 (28%)
Gender
Male 42 (55%) 27 (50%)
Female 34 (45%) 27 (50%)
Highest academic/professional qualification
Degree 3 (4%) 3 (6%)
Diploma 29 (38%) 18 (33%)
Certificate 32 (42%) 17 (31%)
Senior secondary education 2 (3%) 9 (17%)
Junior secondary education 10 (13%) 7 (13%)
Total 76 (100%) 54 (100%)
Job experience (in years)
Mean (n; standard deviation) 10.6 (76; 9.2) 9.8 (54; 8.7)
Number of years working in district
Mean (n; standard deviation) 8.2 (76; 8) 7.9 (54; 6.9)
Number of years working in a health facility
Mean (n; standard deviation) 5.2 (76; 4) 4.9 (54; 5.1)
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job satisfaction was found in the following order, from
highest to lowest: enhanced financing, PBF, and pure
control. This order for overall job satisfaction is contrary
to what we hypothesized and contrary to the order we
found for satisfaction with compensation.
For compensation, respondents in the C1 group re-
ported an average of 8.64% (p < 0.05) lower between
baseline and endline for being rewarded for their hard
work than their counterparts in the PBF group. Likewise,
respondents in the C2 group reported 3.88% (p < 0.1)
lower points between baseline and endline for compen-
sation than those in the C1 group. There was not a sta-
tistically significant difference between the C1 and C2
groups. As expected, we observed higher average satis-
faction with compensation in the PBF group than in the
C1 group, followed by C2 group. Full results for all
questions under each satisfaction construct are in
Additional file 7.
The PBF program added monetary incentives whereas
enhanced financing provided material resources to
improve health infrastructure, both of which increased
workers’ job satisfaction. PBF and, to a lesser degree,
enhanced financing groups both had a consistently
positive effect on satisfaction with working conditions.
Contrary to what we hypothesize though, C1 was not
statistically different than either the PBF or the C2
Table 4 Estimated effect of PBF and enhanced financing on
motivation
Intervention v.
control 1
(N = 448)
Intervention v.
control 2
(N = 462)
Control 1 v.
control 2
(N = 345)
β (standard
error)
β (standard
error)
β (standard
error)
Teamwork 0.39 (3.13) 0.93 (1.43) 1.62 (3.51)
Autonomy 0.82 (4.31) 1.31 (1.77) 1.30 (4.49)
Recognition −0.38 (3.28) −0.84 (1.33) −0.89 (2.85)
Change −2.10 (2.66) 1.03 (1.24) 3.83 (2.64)
Self concept −0.73 (1.87) 0.77 (1.08) 2.21 (2.36)
Work
environment
−1.79 (2.60) 1.26 (1.26) 4.31 (3.03)
Leadership −3.08 (4.89) 1.21 (2.61) 5.55 (5.15)
Well-being 1.10 (2.98) 2.42* (1.24) 3.93 (2.50)
Coefficients, standard errors, and p values are for the interaction between the
random assignment (intervention, control 1, control 2) and study period
(baseline, endline). They are obtained from pair-wise regressions—facility fixed
effect models controlling for workers’ characteristics. Robust standard errors
are clustered at the district level
*p < 0.1
Table 5 Estimated effect of PBF and enhanced financing on job
satisfaction
Intervention v.
control 1
(N = 448)
Intervention v.
control 2
(N = 462)
Control 1 v.
control 2
(N = 345)
β (standard
error)
β (standard
error)
β (standard
error)
Relationship outside
facility
1.64 (2.96) 0.43 (1.49) −0.59 (3.12)
Relationship within
facility
−4.16 (2.82) 0.48 (1.02) 4.94* (2.59)
Work conditions 6.39 (5.12) 4.37* (2.18) 2.20 (5.90)
Recognition 1.44 (2.84) 0.09 (1.32) −1.44 (2.24)
Opportunities 4.69 (4.18) 3.64* (2.00) 2.30 (5.24)
Compensation 8.64** (4.08) 3.88* (1.99) −0.82 (4.87)
Overall satisfaction −0.48 (3.96) 4.75** (2.14) 10.31** (3.94)
Coefficients, standard errors, and p values are for the interaction between the
random assignment (intervention, control 1, control 2) and study period
(baseline, endline). They are obtained from pair-wise regressions—facility fixed
effect models controlling for workers’ characteristics. Robust standard errors
are clustered at the district level
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05
Intervenon groups, or 
ﬁnancing types
• Treatment Group, or 
Incenvized Financing 
(i.e. RBF)
• Control I Group, or 
Nonincenvized 
Financing
• Control II Group, or No 
Enhanced Financing
Mediang factors
• Development and revision of a business 
plan  (pos)
• Adherence to RBF guidelines (pos)
• Professional autonomy (pos)
• Regularly scheduled and mely release 
of funding (pos)
• Auding and feedback from DMO and 
district hospital (pos)
• Team collaboraon (pos)
• Training (pos or neg)
• Low understanding of RBF program (neg)
• Lack of discreon or authority in health 
centre spending (neg)
• Inadequate staﬃng and heavy workload 
(neg)
Individual worker 
outcomes
• Sasfacon  
• Movaon
• Arion
Fig. 2 Mediators of PBF and HRH
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group in terms of satisfaction with work conditions.
Those in the PBF group had increased satisfaction
over availability of supplies between baseline and end-
line relative to those working in health centers that
received enhanced financing (12.97% higher; p < 0.1)
or to those who did not receive additional financing
(7.73% higher; p < 0.05). This finding is surprising
given that the PBF and C1 groups received the same
EmOC equipment, and C1 additionally received finan-
cing not tied to performance. But it makes sense in
light of an unintended effect revealed in the inter-
views: staff workers used personal PBF bonuses as
“re-investment funds” to improve their own working
environment, as is the case in Gwembe.
PBF respondents reported lower overall job satisfac-
tion than enhanced financing respondents for two rea-
sons. First, health care workers felt improving working
conditions was more important than focusing on monet-
ary incentives. The shortages and/or lack of infrastruc-
ture and equipment were major barriers to the delivery
of quality health services:
When I lose a client [dies] as a result of a situation
about which I could have been able to do something
but there is nothing to use, that de-motivates. It’s
better if a client dies from malaria in a situation
where you were able to give him/her quinine or
Coartem. Not where you are supposed to prescribe
the drugs and they are not there; that is really
de-motivating. —Nurse, Gwembe (PBF group)
The availability of transport was also reported as im-
portant for job satisfaction given that many of the rural
health centers were hard to reach. Motorbikes enabled
health workers to travel to outlying areas to conduct
their outreach activities.
Second, the high frequency of administrative audits
and quality assessments tied to the PBF program also
affected overall job satisfaction. All health centers in
Zambia are supposed to receive supervision and sup-
port in the form of an administrative audit from the
DMO once a month and a quality assessment from
the hospital once a quarter, but we found that the C1
and C2 groups received less frequent visits than the
PBF group.17 The audits and assessments had their
drawbacks for the PBF group. Respondents felt that
the visits happened too frequently for any observable
difference to be observed. Further, some respondents
complained that the verification teams would visit un-
announced (intended to prevention falsification of re-
sults) when the staff were inundated with work, when
the health center is short of staff, or when some staff
conversant with PBF issues and processes were work-
ing outside the health center. Finally, some of the
health centers resented the DMO meddling with their
internal affairs:
We were told by the DMO we could include
allowances [in the business plan] only with an
authority letter from PBF. So when you look at it …
strictly speaking, autonomy was not there. —Nurse,
Isoka (PBF group)
This nurse received the DMO’s guidance as a directive.
Countering this, respondents representing the DMO felt
that some health centers spent money outside the pa-
rameters of their business plans, and therefore they had
to be corrected.
Nonetheless, PBF group had more autonomy over the
allocation of resources than either one of the control
groups, by design.18 They had access to their account
balance, and could therefore plan ahead:
For the percentage that was there under PBF; it was
not for the DMO to plan for us. When we got that
money; 2519 percent of that money was for the center
to plan what to buy since we knew the things that we
did not have. This has been a plus, because we were
able to buy things on our own. —Midwife, Gwembe
(PBF group)
PBF funds provided this respondent with a sense of se-
curity because health center staff members were given
spending discretion, but they still had to disburse the
funds in a timely manner. If there was a delay in disburs-
ing government funds, as was the case in Chipepo and
Gwembe, health centers have had to use part of their
PBF funds to cover activities outside the scope of their
original business plan.
The C1 group had less financial autonomy than the
PBF group. Health centers in the C1 group still followed
the traditional protocol of determining their internal
needs, then submitting their purchasing requests to the
local DMO for approval:
We don’t directly receive that [equivalent of PBF
amount of] money for us to buy our stuff. The district
buys for us…I think that the person receiving it on
the other end [in DMO] would not see the
importance and may just leave it out. Therefore, we
should have been receiving that money directly
ourselves; since we are the ones working here and we
are the ones who know what we need and what we
don’t need. —Staff, Itezhi-Tezhi (C1 group)
This respondent simply did not think the Itezhi-Tezhi
DMO, acting as a middleman between the MOH and
the health center, honored his or her health center’s
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needs and the needs of the wider community. In sum, our
qualitative assessment revealed individual job satisfaction
and the relationship between health centers and DMOs
were both affected by the amount of available resources,
PBF program-related assessments, and autonomy to con-
trol financial resources. On net it appears that overall sat-
isfaction was most elevated in the C1 group, followed
closely behind by the PBF group.
Worker attrition
As shown in Table 6, the coefficients in the comparison
between PBF and either C1 or C2 all have the expected
negative signs, interpreted as less staff leaving the PBF
health centers than the ones in the two control groups.
However, only two professional categories were statisti-
cally significant. There were 0.10 (p < 0.05) fewer admin-
istrators on average who left health centers in the PBF
group than in the C1 group. The PBF intervention group
also had lower turnover of nurses, with 0.14 (p < 0.05)
fewer nurses on average who left when compared with
the C2 group.
Low compensation was a reason to look for another
job. Health workers in rural areas further felt that they
were in a disadvantaged position compared to their
counterparts in urban areas because they had poor ac-
cess to the media, information, and training opportun-
ities. This is tied to other reasons for staff turnover
reported such as retirement, illness, marriage, schooling
for workers’ children and dependents, lack of accommo-
dation, or the need to pursue further academic studies
or professional training.
The HRH situation generally improved after the PBF
program was introduced to their district:
For the past two years that we have been with this
PBF, I have never heard any staff saying they want to
go to the hospital…the same people are comfortable
in the health centre…nobody has requested for any
transfer or even talking about it. -Nurse, Isoka
(PBF group)
Many health workers reported engaging in parallel in-
come generation activities such as farming and business
during the baseline interviews. This corresponds to 21%
of a nationally representative sample of health workers
reported being involved in income-augmenting activities
in 2006 [6].20 But health centers became more attractive
as places to work in than district hospitals due to the in-
centives from the PBF program.
Staff shortages and understaffing are problems
strongly endorsed during the baseline interviews.
Managers started paying closer attention to staffing
because the allocation of bonuses through the PBF
program depended heavily on the availability and
placement of qualified staff members in the health
center.
Sometime back, some centers used to be manned by
unqualified staff but when the [PBF] program came,
management was pressured to the extent that we
needed to find where we could source some qualified
staff, such as from the hospitals to go to the [health]
centers… Things have changed now compared to the
past because every health facility now has a qualified
health staff but then, they are not enough. —DMO,
Isoka (PBF group)
But with the emphasis on quality as in skilled
personnel; that [PBF program] has helped us put
every member of staff where they are supposed to
be.—EHT, Gwembe (PBF group)
Having qualified co-workers and greater role clarity
prevented job turnover, especially in the PBF group.
In some of the health centers, such as the three we vis-
ited in Isoka, health cadres chose to give up part of their
individual bonuses to hire non-specialized yet qualified
staff out of institution-wide funds. By doing so, they hoped
to improve the amount of bonus points earned the follow-
ing quarter and, in turn, it would pay off in higher individ-
ual bonuses in the long run. This is a double gain in that
the health center is better staffed to provide quality ser-
vices and it helped increase the relative size of bonus that
everyone on staff can earn. Not all health centers in the
PBF group were able to do the same because the bonuses
they earned were inadequate due to low catchment popu-
lation, low performance, lack of a midwife, etc.
Discussion
In this mixed-methods study, we investigated whether a
national government-implemented PBF scheme
Table 6 Estimated effect of PBF and enhanced financing on
attrition
Intervention v.
control 1
(n = 448)
Intervention v.
control 2
(n = 462)
Control 1 v.
control 2
(n = 345)
β (standard error) β (standard error) β (standard error)
All staff −0.03 (0.05) −0.02 (0.02) −0.00 (0.06)
Clinical officer −0.05 (0.05) 0.04 (0.03) 0.14* (0.08)
Administrator −0.10** (0.05) −0.01 (0.01) 0.07 (0.05)
Nurse −0.19 (0.15) −0.14** (0.06) −0.09 (0.15)
Coefficient denotes number of staff in each category who left the facility
permanently in the last 12 months. Coefficients, standard errors, and p values
are for the interaction between the random assignment (intervention, control
1, control 2) and study period (baseline, endline). They are obtained from
pair-wise regressions—facility fixed effect models controlling for workers’
characteristics. Robust standard errors are clustered at the district level
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05
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improved three HRH outcomes in Zambia: motivation,
job satisfaction, and attrition. Our econometric estimates
suggest that PBF led to increased job satisfaction for a
small number of constructs and decreased attrition of
administrative staff and nurses, but PBF did not lead to
marked effects on motivation. We also found support
for overall job satisfaction and compensation, with both
PBF and enhanced financing experiencing a more posi-
tive effect compared to pure control. However, the gains
were slightly lower for the PBF than for the C1 group.
For attrition, we observed lower turnover for administra-
tors in the PBF group compared to either of the control
groups. Incentive schemes may not have the same effect
on HRH outcomes in another national context, which
differ on labor market conditions including changes in
staff salaries, retirement age, transfers within and across
districts, and education status [32, 33].21
There are indications that PBF has a minor impact on
elicited motivation, which is also what Dale found for
Afghanistan’s performance-based payment program [34].
One channel through which motivation is affected is when
individuals feel strained because they are held accountable
for outcomes not under their direct control, which we did
not find either quantitative or qualitative evidence of [35].
A second concern is that a large enough financial incen-
tive package would diminish personal reasons to work
[36–39]. But our interviews revealed a general balance of
both extrinsic and intrinsic sources of motivation. Some
interviewees revealed self-introspection, which helped us
to ascertain how people energize themselves to persist
working at healthcare delivery.
Complementary to econometric results, our qualitative
assessment shows positive evidence on health workers’
job satisfaction and attrition from PBF and, to some ex-
tent, from enhanced financing. The evidence suggests
that in response to PBF, health care providers worked
harder and some also increased community outreach ac-
tivities in order to earn more bonuses. However, a higher
workload as an imperative to earn points added pressure
on health workers. Among PBF respondents, there was a
sentiment that the district supervision visit was too fre-
quent and sometimes too stringent, thus decreasing
overall job satisfaction. Those in the PBF group did
enjoy autonomy to solve their own problems, which was
not there in practice and thus lessened job satisfaction
with compensation for those in the control groups. Ul-
timately, PBF made health centers more attractive to
work in than hospitals, and with more specialized and
non-specialized positions filled, it allowed skilled pro-
viders to focus on caring for patients. Health workers
appreciate working in a PBF health center not only be-
cause of the financial incentives, but because of profes-
sional dedication, capacity to serve the community, and
opportunities for professional development.
We can envision at least four limitations of this study.
The district pairing design could be somewhat compro-
mised with “contamination” across groups.22 However,
baseline characteristics were similar among workers
across the three groups in Table 1, which lends confi-
dence that results were not susceptible to confounding
bias. Furthermore, as the PBF and C1 interventions were
administered at the district level, communications be-
tween health staff were much greater within than across
districts.
Second, as this is an observational study, recall bias
could affect the accuracy of our estimates, especially be-
cause a recall period was not specified in the survey for
the questions related to motivation and job satisfaction.
However, we believe such psychometric properties
would not differ for the three study groups since all of
the respondents completed the same survey in the same
time period. Third, study instruments could be improved
to deepen the understanding of HRH and MCH out-
comes. Designing the interview guide so that interviews
are carried out with non-managerial staff on a one-on-
one basis would minimize normative bias. Also, medi-
ation analysis can be used in future studies to test
whether, and to what extent, motivation or job satisfac-
tion mediates the relationship between PBF and attrition
or PBF and staff performance. This would not only im-
prove upon our theory of change but, from a perform-
ance management standpoint, improve the design of
systems of incentives and appraisal put in place to pro-
duce the level of performance necessary to achieve
health service objectives.
Lastly, job satisfaction and motivation are abstract
concepts. We expect job satisfaction and motivation
to increase with additional funding, and indeed we do
find evidence supporting this for job satisfaction. But
staff responses to our survey are nuanced in that they
are responding to different levels of pay and to the
conditions of the overall health system. PBF increases
demands on their job roles and pressure to meet PBF
targets. This stress has an impact on worker product-
ivity, turnover, and well-being over and above the
direct extrinsic rewards of provider incentives. There-
fore, future research should examine a confluence of
factors related to staff responses such as employee in-
volvement in setting PBF-related targets, ability to
control the factors which affect meeting those targets,
their perception of the transparency of performance
evaluation process and fairness of reward process, and
adequacy of program funding level. Although the
fields of organization behavior, management, and in-
dustrial and organizational psychology have made
progress on this topic, it is still a challenge to quan-
tify health workers’ job satisfaction and motivation,
especially in health contexts of LMICs.
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Conclusions
This study contributes to the nascent literature on
the effects of PBF on health worker outcomes in
LMICs. The Zambia pilot studied here conferred both
financial and non-financial rewards, such as raising stan-
dards of performance, developing accurate performance
measurement systems, and training managers on how to
give effective feedback. Enhanced financing, which was
used to improve work conditions, can also encourage
health personnel to work harder and stay in rural commu-
nities. Our study calls for a careful examination of the
contextual factors which form the sufficient conditions to
make the desirable effects of performance-based or en-
hanced financing manifest. While some of the conditions
are beyond the immediate Zambian program implemen-
ters’ span of control, such as staffing shortages, many are
under their purview, such as the quality of supervision,
communication, and refresher trainings for staff.
The adoption of PBF is part of health system reforms
[40, 41]. The research literature has not explicitly fo-
cused on an important mediator between PBF incentives
and desired health services outcomes: HRH. The Zambia
PBF program offered incentives to achieve desired MCH
outcomes and, in the process, modified individual health
care provider behavior and investments in entire health
centers. We drew the link between PBF and three HRH
outcomes because poor job satisfaction and motivation
lead to poor performance and higher attrition, thus dis-
rupting continuity of care for patients and, in aggregate,
incurring higher costs for the health system. Our study
not only highlights effective and sustainable ways to
strengthen the health workforce in Zambia, but it has
implications on how to strengthen HRH’s relationship
with other health system building blocks in LMICS.
Endnotes
1Clinical health worker encompasses 12 categories: clin-
ical officers, dental surgeons, doctors, nutritionists, lab sci-
entists, pharmacists, physical therapists, radiographists,
midwives, nurses, environmental health personnel, and
oral health. Clinical health workers are not the same as
administrators, who also work in health facilities.
2Poor staff morale and weak incentives lead to emigra-
tion or migration, which in turn result in a health
worker shortage [54, 55]. An initial wave of Zambian
health workers migrated to countries in sub-Saharan
Africa, such as South Africa, Botswana, and Namibia [56].
Subsequent waves migrated to Europe, North America,
Australia, and New Zealand. An exodus of health profes-
sionals has also been observed within Zambia from rural
to urban areas, from the public to the private sector, and
from curative to preventive care [57, 58].
3PBF is a strategy to address inadequate performance-
reward linkages and, more generally, health system
reform [40, 59]. In this paper we adopt Soeter et al.’s def-
inition of PBF as “fee-for-service conditional on quality
of care” [60].
4Monetary incentives (i.e., bonus payment) can either
be awarded for achievement of predefined performance
targets or withheld if targets are not reached. Individuals
and organizations may also respond to non-monetary
incentives of PBF schemes such as enhanced supervi-
sion, data system development, and institutional rank-
ings [61, 62].
5A wide array of moderators on the “meso-levels,” or
intermediary levels, that could weigh on PBF’s influence
on worker outcomes, which we acknowledge them
though not account for them explicitly in this study. Be-
yond concerns over PBF implementation is fungibility,
i.e., whether health managers allocate revenue to health
worker bonuses or to other assets of equivalent value,
say, equipment, supplies, and capital improvements to
the health care facility. Toonen et al. considered auton-
omy, management capacity, and an understanding of
PBF concepts to be important for implementing PBF
programs in sub-Saharan Africa’s health sector [63].
Mohammed et al. urged a closer look at the “know–do”
gap, or the gap between what health workers know how
to do—and actually do (Mohammed RL, Herbst C,
Leonard K, Goldberg J.: Crossing the Three-Gap Divide
with PBF, unpublished). PBF interventions can reduce
this gap through improved accountability and supervi-
sion structures, and more generally via an improved
working environment.
6Eisenberger et al. argued that rewards could have a
positive, negative or null effect on motivation depending
on the nature of the task assigned in controlled labora-
tory settings [64]. Woolhandler et al. further questioned
the causal direction posed by rewards on motivation in
health care settings in high-income countries [65].
7We make this assertion following Bhatnagar and
George’s observations in Nigeria [66] and Kalk et al.’s
observations in Rwanda [67].
8Job satisfaction is workers’ personal satisfaction rela-
tive to their work situation [68]. The correlation between
income and subjective well-being has been observed
both within and across countries [69]. Yet job satisfac-
tion is a multi-faceted concept. Heneman et al.’s results
indicated a positive relationship between pay-for-
performance perceptions and pay satisfaction [70]. Judge
et al.’s meta analysis results suggested that pay level is
only marginally related to job satisfaction [71]. Job satis-
faction is not just about job conditions but also person-
ality. In an earlier study, Judge et al. found that traits of
core self-evaluations, or positive self-concept, are posi-
tive dispositional predictors of job satisfaction [72]. The
PBF scheme in Zambia primarily responds workers’ sat-
isfaction with their compensation, but it might also
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respond to the other six aspects of job satisfaction we
measure. Therefore, like motivation, we hypothesize that
PBF has a positive effect on job satisfaction. We further
hypothesize that enhanced financing would also have a
positive effect on job satisfaction, but with a lower mag-
nitude than PBF because enhancing financing primarily
addresses one aspect of job satisfaction, or satisfaction
with work conditions.
9Porter et al.’s longitudinal study results further sug-
gested that satisfaction with pay is most acute at time
points closest to when psychiatric technicians intend to
leave their organization [73].
10We expect to see stronger effects on HRH results for
the intervention (PBF) group than for the control 1 (C1;
enhanced financing) group, but the direction is expected
to remain the same for the following reason: RBF can be
interpreted by health workers as a reward for their indi-
vidual efforts, whereas enhanced financing can be inter-
preted by them as a signal of recognition for collective
efforts through improvements on working conditions.
Both incentive schemes are expected have positive,
knock-on effects on HRH outcomes compared with the
control 2 (C2; pure control) group.
11The amount of bonus received by each staff member
was dependent on a number of factors: individual per-
formance scores taken during a performance appraisal,
actual PBF income made, investment priorities, the
number and composition of staff at the health center,
and individual government salary levels. The ratio was
higher at the start of the PBF project but dropped after
about 6 months of the PBF project due to an increase in
government salaries ranging from 100 to 200% [27].
Nonetheless, PBF staff bonuses led to an absolute in-
crease in the personal income for staff but by different
margins/percentages across staff and health centers.
12It should also be noted that, unlike the PBF districts,
health centers in C1 districts did not have devolved au-
tonomy, enhanced supervision, training, access to PBF
reference materials, and data monitoring and verification
that were also part of the PBF intervention.
13The surveys collected information on human re-
sources and physical capacity, facility governance, practi-
tioner knowledge, outreach activities and other initiatives,
and quality of care and practitioner behavior through pa-
tient exit interviews.
14At baseline, health centers and DMO offices in
Gwembe (PBF group), Itezhi-Tezhi (C1 group) and
Mazabuka (C2 group) in the Southern Province of
Zambia were included in the sample. Southern Province
reflects the median levels of socio-economic status and
health indicators across all the ten Zambian rural prov-
inces, so focusing data collection efforts on this province
enabled easier identification of cross-cutting issues for
PBF and human resources. Five additional interviews
with conducted with Provincial Medical Officers in
Livingstone. At endline, health centers in four districts
(Isoka, Gwembe, Itezhi-Tezhi, Mazabuka) were pur-
posely sampled based on a multitude of characteristics
such as remoteness, size of catchment area, urban/rural
split, performance, and staff-mix.
15Cognitive evaluation theory (CET) predicts that
extrinsic rewards would diminish, if not displace, in-
trinsic interest [36]. Deci et al.’s meta analysis con-
cluded that extrinsic awards decreased intrinsic
motivation regardless of the form of incentive: en-
gagement-, completion-, or performance-contingent
awards [39]. Decreased intrinsic motivation negatively
affects worker autonomy, purpose, altruism and com-
petence [74]. Huillery and Seban found lower staff at-
tendance and on-the-job effort after the PBF pilot
ended in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which
they attribute to not only lowered motivation, but a
switch from intrinsic to extrinsic motivation on the
workers’ behalf [75]. However we do not find evi-
dence in support of CET.
16Likewise, Brock et al. have found that peer scrutiny
and encouragement alone can determine quality of care
provided by clinicians in their sample [76].
17During administrative audit and quality assessment
visits, the verifiers would look at all aspects of PBF pro-
gram implementation and see how health centers were
performing against standards and benchmarks. After
their visit, the verifiers would debrief health center staff
on their strengths and weaknesses, and with the health
center cadres devise potential solutions.
18PBF funds were determined from performance and
then disbursed from the MoH directly into each health
center’s bank account. PBF funds did not pass through
the DMO. The health cadres of Isoka and Gwembe dis-
tricts, both PBF groups, had high involvement in priori-
tizing needs and use of PBF money without having to
wait for the DMO to tell them what to do.
19The amount should be 40%.
20Health staff who were engaged in income-generating
activities in order to augment their salaries has also been
observed in Democratic Republic of Congo [77], in
Sierra Leone [78], and in Tanzania [79].
21For example, Zambia raised salaries for all govern-
ment workers in 2011 and in 2013 by between 100 to
200% which had an effect on the size of the staff
bonus.
22For example, health workers from either of the
control groups may have sought employment in one
of the health centers in the PBF group. Health
workers across the three study groups could also have
been sharing information about how to generate add-
itional income from means other than the PBF pro-
gram [80].
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